Laserfiche WebLink
Attachment I <br /> 28905 Wight Road <br /> 1lik1;4 Y,$ Malibu.California 90265 <br /> ¢ 'p (3!0)457-097x, <br /> :hr' ^.tin h. c <br /> . � r <br /> VIA CERTIFIED MAIL <br /> August 2,2021 <br /> Karen Diaz, City Clerk <br /> City of Pleasanton <br /> 123 Main Street <br /> P.O. Box 520 <br /> Pleasanton, CA 94566 <br /> Re: Violation of California Voting Rights Act <br /> I write on behalf of our client, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project and its <br /> members residing within the City of Pleasanton (``Pleasanton' or "City"). Pleasanton relies <br /> upon an at-large election system for electing candidates to its governing board. Moreover. <br /> voting within the City is racially polarized, resulting in minority vote dilution, and, <br /> therefore, the City's at-large elections violate the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 <br /> (''CVRA"). <br /> The CVRA disfavors the use of so-called ''at-large"voting— an election method that permits <br /> voters of an entire jurisdiction to elect candidates to each open seat. See generally Sanchez <br /> v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4' 660, 667 (''Sanchez"). For example, if the U.S. <br /> Congress were elected through a nationwide at-large election, rather than through typical <br /> single-member districts, each voter could cast up to 435 votes and vote for any candidate in <br /> the country, not just the bare candidates in the voter's district, and the 435 candidates <br /> receiving the most nationwide votes would be elected. At-large elections thus allow a <br /> majority of voters to control every seat, not just the seats in a particular district or a <br /> proportional majority of seats. <br /> Voting rights advocates have targeted "at-large" election schemes for decades, because they <br /> often result in "vote dilution," or the impairment of minority groups' ability to elect their <br /> preferred candidates or influence the outcome of elections, which occurs when the electorate <br /> votes in a racially polarized manner. See Thornburg v. Gingles. 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) <br /> (''Gingles"). The U.S. Supreme Court ''has long recognized that multi-member districts and <br /> at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength" of <br /> minorities. Id. at 47: see also id. at 48, fn. 14 (at-large elections may also cause elected <br />