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The summary results based on actual market rents and actual rent control guidelines <br /> shows: <br /> Annual Rent Monthly Rent Percent <br /> Increase Increase Increase <br /> per Market Rate per Market Rate in Rent per <br /> Market Rate <br /> Unit Unit Unit <br /> Five percent(5%)Inclusionary: $733 $61 2.16% <br /> Ten percent(10%) Inclusionary: $1,507 $126 4.55% <br /> Fifteen percent(15%)Inclusionary: $2,309 $192 7.15% <br /> Twenty percent(20%) Inclusionary: $3,326 $277 10.64% <br /> Twenty Five percent(25%)Indus.: $4,474 $373 14.85% <br /> The rent increases are more than proportional because each increase in the <br /> inclusionary requirement increases the number of units that need to be subsidized, <br /> while reducing the number of market rate units available to provide those subsidies. <br /> Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the draft Pleasanton 2023-2031 Housing Element <br /> proposes to increase the rent control requirement on new multi-family projects from <br /> 15% to 20% - to "prove" Pleasanton's world class commitment to affordable housing. <br /> Who Pays for Inclusionary Rent Control Subsidies? <br /> a. Impact on Project Rents <br /> At the project level, the rent subsidy comes from the renters paying market rate rents. <br /> There can be no other source for that subsidy. It does not come from developer profits <br /> — here is why: <br /> For the project builder, that rent subsidy equals a loss in net operating income (NOI) <br /> (and thus net profit) for the project. To justify a new project, the annual net profit (after <br /> deducting all expenses and rent subsidies), typically capitalized at about 5%, needs to <br /> equal or exceed the cost of constructing the project. If not, no construction takes place <br /> until the rent levels for the entire local market rise enough to make the project feasible. <br /> Based on actual rent levels in Pleasanton on the 345 unit example project, and applying <br /> Pleasanton's current inclusionary requirement of 15% rent controlled units, that project <br /> would require $678,708 per year of rent subsidies, in perpetuity (Exhibit B-4 at Bates p. <br /> 6). The project upon completion, with net profit capitalized at 5%, would be worth <br /> $13,574,160 less than if there were no inclusionary rent controls. And, the pro forma <br /> (financial projection) still needs to show the builder making a profit, or the project will not <br /> be financed or built. <br /> That 345 unit project was fortunate in coming early in that RHNA cycle, at a time when <br /> Pleasanton was anxious to show progress cin meeting its RHNA numbers, and also <br /> needed cash to help rebuild a senior housing project. So, instead of the $13,574,160 <br />