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simply assumed that inclusionary requirements are development exactions (see footnote 4 above). Home builders, developers, and, in particular the Pacific Legal Foundation, have brought a series of cases l° attacking inclusionary ordinances on various grounds (including equal protection, substantive due process, etc.) but in particular designed to bring the ordinances under the intermediate scrutiny prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court's Nollan/Dolan decisions. h3 California, there has also been an effort to bring inclusionary requirements (particularly in-lieu fees) under the purview of the Mitigation Fee Act. (Alan Seltzer's companion paper provides an excellent analysis of these cases and issues.) The goal has been to treat inclusionary requirements as impact fees and to require a nexus-type study to justify them, in order to make it more difficult for jurisdictions to impose these requirements. As stated in one law review article: If the exactions rules did apply to [inclusionary] programs, . . . jurisdictions would have to make difficult, individualized demonstrations of the connection between the proposed project and an increase in the affordable housing shortage, and demonstrate proportionality with the percentage of affordable units or fees required. Demonstrating nexus and proportionality would not be impossible insofar as each new unit of market- priced housing in an expensive region boosts the need for service workers who cannot afford to pay market prices in such an area. Nevertheless, a burden of showing nexus and proportionality would raise the costs and risks for local governments that rely on inclusionary zoning as a tool for addressing affordable housing crises.20 Until Patterson, these efforts were generally unsuccessful. That is in part because the litigants were somewhat entranced by Nollan/Dolan and based their litigation strategy (in Napa and in Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica,21 for example) on subjecting inclusionary ordinances to Nollan/Dolan rather on characterizing inclusionary requirements as 19 Napa and Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, discussed in detail in Alan Seltzer's paper, were both litigated by the Pacific Legal Foundation. Mead v. City of Cotati, 2008 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 94238,and Kamoole Pointe Dev. L.P. v. County of Maui, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (Dist. Hawaii(2008)).also litigated by the PLF. have been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Other challenges settled prior to a published decision have been filed against Sacramento County and the City of San Diego by the B1A or developers. 20 Fenster,supra note 4,at 657. 2' 166 Cal.App.4'"456 (2008). 7 990051\I\720372.3 8/7/2009